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1Introduction
1. Credibility and Public Debt
Like many areas of economic policy, public borrowing is subject to a cred-
ibility problem. Borrowing on capital markets is advantageous, because
it gives governments a means of deferring part of the cost of ﬁnancing
public goods. A state that has access to credit can expand public invest-
ment without a sharp and immediate increase in taxation. The problem
is that once a government has borrowed, it may face incentives to de-
fer repayment or even to default on its obligations, in order to reduce
the burden of taxation on those who contribute to repay debts. De-
fault was a common occurrence that hindered the development of pub-
lic borrowing in early modern Europe. Today, default may no longer
be a worry for those who are considering investing in bonds issued by
OECD governments, but it is a major issue for governments in devel-
oping and transition economies that seek to offer assurances about debt
repayment. If prospective lenders anticipate that a government may de-
fault, they will invest only if they are given a high rate of return that
compensates for this risk. In extreme cases, they will refrain from lending
at all.
This book investigates the link between public debt and representa-
tive democracy. In it I develop three theoretical arguments about the
effect of constitutional checks and balances, political parties, and bu-
reaucratic delegation on government credibility, and I then confront these
propositions with historical evidence from England and France during the
eighteenth century. In a concluding chapter I consider broader implica-
tions of my ﬁndings, focusing on links between democracy and economic
performance and on the study of institutions. The theoretical sections
of the book use basic game-theoretic models to examine how different
1
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institutional features of representative government inﬂuence the possibil-
ity for states to commit to repaying their debts. While there are now a
number of studies that investigate how representative institutions may
allow governments to solve commitment problems, some authors have
argued that this literature often fails to explicitly consider partisan mo-
tivations on the part of political actors.1 Alternatively, those models of
commitment problems in debt and taxation that do take partisan mo-
tivations into account often pay only limited attention to institutional
features of decision making.2 The theoretical and empirical analysis here
attempts to ﬁll this gap by drawing simultaneously on political economy
theories that emphasize partisan pressures on economic policy, as well
as analyses that show how the rules of democratic decision making may
inﬂuence economic policy choices.
I pay particular attention to three features of representative politi-
cal institutions that may improve a government’s ability to make cred-
ible commitments. The ﬁrst emphasizes constitutional checks and bal-
ances (multiple veto points in current terminology). According to one
view, which extends back to theorists such as Madison andMontesquieu,
representative institutions improve commitment when they involve fea-
tures such as a division of power between legislature and executive or
between multiple houses of a legislature. My ﬁrst main argument sug-
gests that while constitutional checks and balances can improve possi-
bilities for credible commitment, they are neither a necessary nor a suf-
ﬁcient condition for this to occur. They are not a necessary condition,
because interests opposed to default may gain inﬂuence even in the ab-
sence of checks and balances. They are not a sufﬁcient condition, because
those opposed to default may fail to gain inﬂuence even in a country
where the constitution provides for checks and balances. The implica-
tions of this argument for credible commitment have not been previously
examined.
A second potential credibility-enhancing feature of representative in-
stitutions involves party formation in a plural society. When governments
borrow, a division is likely to emerge between those who own public
debt and those who pay the taxes to service public debt. This raises the
1 See Przeworksi and Limongi (1993) and Elster (2000). Themost frequently cited piece
in the literature on representative institutions and credible commitment is North and
Weingast (1989). See also Bates (1996), De Long and Shleifer (1993), Firmin-Sellers
(1994), Levy and Spiller (1996), North (1981, 1990), Olson (1993, 2000), Shepsle
(1991), Tsebelis (2002), and Weingast (1995, 1997).
2 A good example here is the model in Persson and Tabellini (1994) .
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question of how society could commit to repaying debt if creditors are a
minority of the population. My second main argument suggests that in
societies where there are multiple dimensions of political conﬂict, even
if government creditors are a small minority, other groups can face in-
centives to support timely repayment of debts in order to gain the sup-
port of government creditors on issues such as religion, foreign policy,
or constitutional questions. As a result, careful attention should be paid
to whether political conﬂict is in fact multidimensional and to whether
government creditors are able to form durable coalitions with other so-
cial groups. This second argument implies that democratic compromise
may provide commitment even in the absence of constitutional checks
and balances.3
A third feature of representative government thatmay enhance credibil-
ity involves the possibility for rulers and politicians to delegate authority
to individuals who are committed to pursuing a particular policy, whether
it be repaying debt, maintaining low inﬂation, or regulating industries in a
socially desirable manner. In the area of public borrowing it was common
for rulers in early modern Europe to delegate authority with the express
intent of improving their credibility. So, for example, a ruler might give a
group of ofﬁcials the right to manage public revenues so as to ensure full
debt repayment. My third main argument suggests that bureaucratic del-
egation can reduce default risk, but it will be ineffectual in doing so unless
creditor interests have power within a representative assembly, either as
an outright majority or as part of a majority coalition. The reason is that
when government creditors lack such political inﬂuence, rulers will ﬁnd it
easy to alter unilaterally agreements with individuals to whom they have
delegated.
In exploring the politics of debt repayment, this book also asks when
the institutions or practices that reduce the risk of default are consis-
tent with basic democratic principles. The key question here is, When
does commitment occur as a result of democratic politics pushing policies
toward “moderate” outcomes? and alternatively, When is the problem
solved only at the expense of democracy, by giving government creditors
a privileged position in society? As a result, this study should be relevant
not only to theoretical debates about credibility, but also to debates about
the “structural power of capital” and economic policy making in an era
of global ﬁnance.
3 The effect of multi-issue conﬂict on economic policy choices has also been considered
recently by Besley and Coate (2001) and Roemer (1998, 1999, 2001).
3
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2. Historical Setting and Scope of the Study
My empirical focus on Britain and France is motivated by the fact that
it has become popular to contrast the ﬁnancial experiences of these two
countries during the eighteenth century. Great Britain has been portrayed
as the ﬁrst state to establish a modern system of public ﬁnance, while
France has been viewed more frequently as an example of failed reform.4
For some authors, understanding the development of state ﬁnance in the
two countries has been the end objective of study, while for others, state
ﬁnance has proved of interest because of the possible linkwith other devel-
opments including economic growth and international rivalries.5 In this
book I pursue the former approach. As a result, I do not directly consider
whether state ﬁnances must be sound before private ﬁnancial markets
can develop.6 Nor do I seek to ask whether the Glorious Revolution in
Great Britain coincided with increased protection of property rights in
the economy more generally.7 My objective is instead to consider Great
Britain and France as fascinating cases that can be used to develop more
general inferences about the link between representative government and
credible commitment. In so doing I hope to add to other recent work
that considers the link between political institutions and state ﬁnance in
early modern Europe.8 I also hope to show that it is possible to use game
theoretic models of politics combined with historical analysis in the style
of “comparative historical institutionalism.”9 Finally, while I draw exten-
sively on research in the ﬁelds of economic history and political history, as
well as primary sources in selected areas, it is worth emphasizing that this
book is primarily a work of political science. My goal for the empirical
4 Several classic contributions on the development of state ﬁnance in Britain include
Clapham’s study on the Bank of England (1958), Dickson (1967), Roseveare (1969,
1991), and, more recently, Brewer (1989) and Jones (1988). Knowledge about state
ﬁnance in eighteenth-century France has been signiﬁcantly expanded by Hoffman,
Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal (2000), Lu¨thy (1959–61), Marion (1919), Riley (1987),
and Velde and Weir (1992). Comparative studies on state ﬁnance include Bonney
(1999) and Mathias and O’Brien (1976).
5 See Schultz and Weingast (1996).
6 This is a claim made by North and Weingast (1989) but contested by Hoffman et al.
(2000). See also Rousseau and Sylla (2001) for a more general discussion on the
historical link between ﬁnancial development and growth.
7 Clark (1996) has argued that security of property rights was a feature of the British
economy well before 1688.
8 See Carruthers (1996), Ertman (1997), Hoffman and Norberg (1994), Potter (1997,
2000), Potter and Rosenthal (1997), and Root (1994).
9 See Thelen (1999) on this point.
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chapters is to draw on historical work on England and France in order to
gain new perspectives on enduring questions posed by political scientists
and economists. Likewise, I hope that historians may ﬁnd this book of
interest to the extent that it draws links between partisan politics, political
institutions, and state ﬁnance in a way that existing work may not have
emphasized.
The British historical background to this study involves the dramatic
set of changes that took place in English government ﬁnance after the
Glorious Revolution of 1688. When faced with the need to borrow,
English monarchs before 1688 had resorted largely to ad hoc methods;
default on these loans had always been a possibility; and as a result
the Crown had often been unable to gain access to credit at anything
less than exorbitant rates of interest. After the Glorious Revolution this
picture changed dramatically. Methods for borrowing were regularized,
Parliament gained substantial prerogatives in the area of public ﬁnance,
the Bank of England was created, and the Crown found itself able to bor-
row larger amounts at lower rates of interest than ever before. Many of
these changes were directly inspired by earlier institutional reforms in the
Netherlands, a subject I explore in Chapter 3. It was the simultaneous
nature of these developments in Great Britain that prompted North and
Weingast (1989) in their seminal article to suggest there was a causal link
between the establishment of a limited monarchy in the United Kingdom
and improved access to credit.
Chapter 4 presents evidence to show that interest rates on British gov-
ernment debt did indeed take a downward trend after 1688. However,
what North and Weingast’s argument seems less able to explain is why
it took over thirty years after 1688 before the British government could
borrow as cheaply as could the government of Holland, which was uni-
versally recognized at the time for its creditworthiness. Moreover, despite
the long-term trend toward lower costs of borrowing, there was very sig-
niﬁcant volatility in interest rates during the reigns of King William III
(1689–1702) and of Queen Anne (1702–14), as well as periodic runs on
Bank of England shares. At times during these years the British Crown
actually found itself borrowing at rates as high as those that had prevailed
before 1688, and as high as those paid by the French monarchy. These
observations raise questions about how debt politics evolved over time
in the United Kingdom. Was this post-1688 volatility related to politi-
cal events, such as changes in the partisan control of government? What
were the factors that allowed the British government after 1715 to bor-
row as cheaply as the Dutch government?While economic historians have
5
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extensively documented the development of British government borrow-
ing after 1688, the possibility that post-1688 trends in interest rates were
correlated with political trends has not been thoroughly investigated.
I argue that the improvement in the British Crown’s access to ﬁnance
cannot be understood unless one recognizes that apart from the estab-
lishment of a limited monarchy, the last decade of the seventeenth cen-
tury also witnessed another major change: the development of cohesive
political parties.10 Politics in Great Britain between 1688 and 1742 was
characterized by conﬂict between two parties, the Whigs and the Tories,
that took differing stances on a range of issues including religion, the
succession to the throne, foreign policy, and state ﬁnance. The Whigs in
particular were a party founded on a compromise among several different
groups with diverse interests, including government creditors, Protestant
dissenters seeking religious freedom, and landed aristocrats who sought,
among other objectives, to increase Parliament’s constitutional preroga-
tives. Because those landowners who participated in the Whig coalition
differedwith government creditors over questions of taxation and ﬁnance,
it was crucial for the success of the coalition that both groups nonetheless
had similar preferences on a number of other issues in British politics.
From the 1720s, as issues such as religion became less salient in British
politics, the Whig coalition under Robert Walpole was increasingly held
together by patronage, though patronage alone never sufﬁced forWalpole
to maintain a majority.
In Chapters 4 and 5, I show that trends in interest rates on U.K. govern-
ment debt after 1688 can be better understood when one considers that
government creditors were active members of the Whig party, whereas
the Tory party was much more closely aligned with those landed inter-
ests who chafed at the tax payments necessary to repay public debt on
schedule. Chapter 4 presents several basic econometric tests to show that
interest rates on U.K. government debt tended to be lower when theWhig
party had ﬁrmer control of Parliament. Given that the shareholders of the
Bank of England were the most prominent of the government’s new cred-
itors during this period, it is not surprising that the split between Whigs
10 In emphasizing the importance of political parties, I draw on extensive work by
historians of eighteenth-century Britain, as well as recent work by Carruthers (1990,
1996). Historical work on political parties in early eighteenth-century Britain is
discussed extensively in Chapter 6 and includes studies by De Krey (1985), Hayton
(1984, 2002), Holmes (1967, 1993), Holmes and Speck (1967), Jones (1991, 1997),
Plumb (1967), Richards (1972), Sedgwick (1970), Speck (1970, 1977, 1981), and
Walcott (1956).
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and Tories over state ﬁnance was also reﬂected in Bank of England share
prices. These suffered a precipitous crash after a Tory electoral victory in
1710.11
While the British government after 1688 gained access to larger quan-
tities of credit at lower rates of interest, no such change took place in
France, and the French Crown would continue for the duration of the
eighteenth century to face greater difﬁculty than its British counterpart
in borrowing. This has prompted a number of authors to suggest that
the French Crown’s difﬁculties were attributable to the failure to adopt
British-style institutions. Painstaking work by economic historians has
provided evidence consistent with this argument. Throughout the eigh-
teenth century the French monarchy was forced to borrow at signiﬁcantly
higher interest rates than did the British government.12
While discussions of state ﬁnance in eighteenth-century France have
often focused on “missed opportunities” for institutional reform, I ar-
gue that even if France had adopted British-style institutions, this would
have been unlikely to improve the monarchy’s credibility as a borrower.
To support this claim I focus on three speciﬁc episodes of abortive re-
form. The ﬁrst occurred following the death of Louis XIV in 1715. In the
midst of a major ﬁnancial crisis, several senior ﬁgures in the French court
proposed reinvigorating France’s national representative institution, the
Estates General, which had not met since 1614. Two authors have recently
argued that the failure of the Regent of France to follow England’s exam-
ple at this time represented a missed opportunity for the French monarch
to establish credibility for its ﬁnancial commitments. In doing so, however,
Sargent and Velde (1995) do not consider which partisan forces would
have been represented within the Estates. Chapter 6 presents evidence
from contemporary eighteenth-century observers that the result of calling
the Estates General would in fact have been to trigger a default on debt,
rather than to avoid one. Evidence on the political divisions in French
society during this period supports the conjecture that within the Estates
11 This conclusion that default risk on government debt was lower under the Whigs
represents a difference between my own interpretation of events and the argument
about partisan politics presented by Carruthers (1990, 1996). Carruthers empha-
sizes the link between religion, party, and state ﬁnance, but he does not focus on
credibility of debt repayment, nor does his work give as much emphasis to the role
of political parties as heterogeneous coalitions.
12 See in particular the study by Velde and Weir (1992), which is described in greater
detail in Chapter 4. Hoffman et al. (2000) demonstrate that in spite of the French
Crown’s lack of credibility as a debtor, private ﬁnancial markets developed quite
rapidly in France during the latter half of the eighteenth century.
7
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General, government creditors would have been poorly represented. As a
result, the establishment of representative political institutions may well
have been insufﬁcient to solve the French Crown’s borrowing problems.
A second episode of failed institutional reform in France involved the
national bank created by the Scottish ﬁnancier John Law in 1716. The
Regent who governed France agreed to Law’s plan for a public bank that
would issue a paper currency and that would aid the monarchy in retiring
its stock of debt. The plan was inspired in part by the success of the Bank
of England, which had been founded in 1694. Law’s bank failed soon
after its creation, however, due in large part to an excess issue of bank
notes. His project was one of a series of attempts by French rulers during
the eighteenth century to borrow indirectly from the public via corporate
groups or public banks in order to obtain better access to credit. The
failure of these institutional innovations to establish credibility shows
that as long as they retain the right to alter agreements unilaterally with
ofﬁcials to whom they have delegated authority, then absolute monarchs
and other unconstrained rulers will ﬁnd it impossible to reduce default
risk through delegation.
After the period of ﬁnancial crises following the death of Louis XIV and
the failure of Law’s bank, there was a gradual transformation of French
public borrowing during the eighteenth century. The monarchy relied in-
creasingly on the sale of bonds purchased by a broad cross-section of the
French population. As a result, it would be inaccurate to say that there
was no evolution of French ﬁnancial institutions during this period.13 No
reduction in default risk accompanied these changes, however, as studies
have shown that the French government continued to pay a premium on
its loans, and in fact there were two further defaults in 1759 and in 1770.
With this background of repeated crises of public ﬁnance, the deputies
of the new French Constituent Assembly in 1789 (now the chief law-
making body in France) faced several options including proposals to de-
fault, to raise new taxes, and/or to create a national central bank. In the
end, a majority opposed the proposal to create a national bank similar to
the Bank of England, but the assembly did vote to create a new currency,
the assignat, backed by funds generated from the conﬁscation of church
lands. Subsequently, excess issues of assignats led to massive price inﬂation
in France. Some authors have seen this episode as another missed oppor-
tunity for the French government to adopt the sort of ﬁnancial institutions
that would have improved its access to ﬁnance (Sargent and Velde 1995).
13 See Hoffman et al. (2000).
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Chapter 6 presents evidence that supports a different interpretation. The
difﬁculties of the new revolutionary government were due not only to a
failure to adopt certain institutional innovations. More fundamentally,
they reﬂected an underlying distribution of political forces in France that
was unfavorable to government creditors. Unlike the Glorious Revolution
of 1688 in England, the transfer of signiﬁcant prerogatives to a legislative
assembly in France in 1789 was not accompanied by the development of
a cohesive majority coalition within which government creditors played
a signiﬁcant role.
3. Theories of Representative Government and Credible Commitment
Theoretical arguments about representative government and commitment
focus on the idea that there is less risk of a sudden reversal of policy
when decisions are made by a legislature, rather than by an unconstrained
executive such as an absolute monarch or a dictator. While this claim
is an appealing one, existing work has not fully addressed the question
of why those who control representative institutions should necessarily
oppose actions such as defaulting on public debts. One possibility may be
that devolving power to a legislative assembly will improve credibility if
those who represent government creditors constitute amajority within the
legislature. On the other hand, one could just as easily imagine a scenario
where creditors would be in the minority, and thus a legislative majority
would have an incentive to default on debt, because this would allow
a reduction in future taxes. This would seem all the more likely given
that in many historical contexts ownership of government debt has been
concentrated within a narrow segment of the population.14 Theoretical
work in the ﬁeld of political economy has not considered this issue in
detail.15
To consider the link between representative government and public
debt, then, one needs to allow for the possibility that legislators may
represent government creditors, but they may also represent those who
pay the taxes to service debt. When a legislature is given decision-making
14 In their discussion of England after 1688, North andWeingast (1989) do not directly
confront this issue, apart from suggesting that the “commercially minded Whig
ruling coalition” would have found it anathema to default.
15 One interesting exception here is an article by Dixit and Londregan (2000) that
suggests that those who expect to hold power in the future will be more likely to
purchase government debt. Their article, however, does not speciﬁcally consider
decision making within a legislative assembly.
9
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power over issues of debt and taxation, this should only reduce default risk
if the legislative majority takes the interest of government creditors into
account when making policy. In some legislatures, government creditors
may actually formamajority, inwhich case the analysis is straightforward.
This seems to be a fair description of the Estates of Holland during the
sixteenth century, an early example of borrowing by a legislature that is
considered in Chapter 3. More frequently, though, government creditors
will be in theminority.Within the British Parliament during the eighteenth
century, in fact, the overwhelming majority of legislators were landhold-
ers, as were their constituents. Given that landowners paid a signiﬁcant
share of the taxes that went to service government debt during this pe-
riod, this raises the question of why granting more power to Parliament
after 1688 should have necessarily reduced the risk of a default. More
generally, how could a legislature commit to repaying debts if those who
represent government creditors make up only a small percentage of its
members?
Constitutional Checks and Balances
One way to reﬁne the argument about political representation and public
debt is to suggest that what actually matters for credibility is the num-
ber of constitutionally determined veto points in a political system.16 The
greater the number of veto points, the greater the likelihood that those
favorable to repaying debt will be able to block attempts to default. This
follows the classic defense given by JamesMadison inTheFederalistNo. 51
for checks and balances in government; oppression of a minority by the
majority will be less likely to occur when the legislature is divided into
different branches, and when there is a separate executive and legislature
16 A “veto point” can be deﬁned as a political institution, the holder of which has
the power to block a proposed change in policy. Throughout this study when I re-
fer to “veto points” or “veto players” I am referring to what Tsebelis (2002) calls
“institutional” veto players, those speciﬁed by a country’s constitution. Tsebelis
distinguishes “institutional” veto players who have veto power because a country’s
constitution grants them this authority, and “partisan” veto players, who are indi-
vidual member parties or factions in a ruling coalition. The latter may have veto
power because they can threaten to exit a coalition if a bill they ﬁnd unfavorable is
passed. As a result, Tsebelis’s “partisan” veto players are similar to the individual
groups I consider that combine to form political parties. The key difference is that
in Chapter 2, I provide an explicit model of the process of party formation rather
than assuming that each group within a party is a veto player. For a comprehensive
discussion of veto points and policy making, see Tsebelis (2002).
10
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so that they can balance against each other. Madison himself followed
earlier thinkers, and notably Montesquieu, who also saw the separation
of powers as a means of protecting minority rights.17 Following on this
idea, we might suggest that establishing representative government will
increase credibility to the extent that it involves an increase in the number
of veto points in a political system.North andWeingast suggest something
close to this in the conclusion to their 1989 article, highlighting the im-
portance of the “balance between Parliament and the monarchy” in Great
Britain after 1688 and of the presence of multiple veto points.18 So, for
example, if an absolute monarchy or a dictatorship (where there is only
one constitutional veto point) is replaced with a unicameral legislature,
then credibility may not be enhanced. If, on the other hand, an absolute
monarchy is transformed into a limited monarchy where both king and
Parliament have the right to veto policy proposals, then opportunities
for commitment may be enhanced by the fact that the Parliament places a
check on the authority of the monarch, while the monarch simultaneously
places a check on the authority of Parliament.
A key question about constitutional checks and balances is whether
the mere existence of institutions such as bicameralism, or a separation
of power between legislature and executive, is sufﬁcient to ensure that
a given political group – such as government creditors – controls a veto
point. Alternatively, one might argue that checks and balances will only
ensure commitment if there is some mechanism that makes it virtually
certain that a given group will control a speciﬁc institution, such as the
upper chamber of a legislature. Modern critics of the separation of pow-
ers system have long suggested that in practice it is intended to stack the
deck of the political game so that certain groups are ensured veto power.
Charles Beard (1913) made a famous critique of the U.S. Constitution
as an attempt by owners of property to reduce the risk that republican
government might be controlled by debtors and small farmers. Subse-
quent work has pointed out weaknesses in Beard’s account, but the un-
derlying question remains. Among the founding fathers in the United
States, Alexander Hamilton was the most explicit supporter of giving
owners of property a privileged position in government, as illustrated by
17 De L’Esprit des Lois, book XI.
18 Referring to the constitutional changes introduced after 1688: “Increasing the num-
ber of veto players implied that a larger set of constituencies could protect themselves
against political assault, thus markedly reducing the circumstances under which
opportunistic behavior by the government could take place” (1989: 829).
11
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the following statement made to the Federal Convention of 1787:
All communities divide themselves into the few and the many. The ﬁrst are the
rich and well born, the other the mass of the people. The voice of the people has
been said to be the voice of God: and however generally this maxim has been
quoted and believed, it is not true in fact. The people are turbulent and changing;
they seldom judge or determine right. Give therefore to the ﬁrst class a distinct,
permanent share in government. They will check the unsteadiness of the second,
and as they cannot receive any advantage by a change, they therefore will ever
maintain good government.19
There have been critiques of Montesquieu’s support for the separation
of powers that parallel Beard’s critique of the U.S. Constitution. Althusser
(1959) suggested that Montesquieu’s advocacy of the separation of pow-
ers was motivated by a desire to ensure that the nobility would retain a
privileged position in French society.20 Montesquieu in The Spirit of the
Laws does in fact make quite explicit his preference for a bicameral legis-
lature with the upper chamber reserved for the nobility.21 It is interesting
to note in this regard that Montesquieu’s idea of the separation of powers
as a check on majority rule drew on earlier visions going back to Aristotle
of a “mixed constitution” that would provide guaranteed representation
for each segment of society.22 In contemporary terms, one reason why
federal systems may be particularly effective at protecting minority rights
is precisely because they give guaranteed representation to certain groups
(based on geographic location). One might make the same observation
of the power-sharing arrangements that are sometimes created after civil
wars; these too are characterized by guaranteed representation for each
party.
Existing formal treatments of the effect of veto points have not asked
whether multiple veto points alone are sufﬁcient to ensure credible com-
mitment, or alternatively whether credibility can be achieved only if, in
addition to creating multiple veto points, there is some mechanism that
19 Max Farrand, ed.,TheRecordsof theFederalConventionof1787 (NewHaven, 1911),
vol. 1, p. 299. On this subject, see also the discussion in Manin (1997).
20 Althusser himself relies heavily on earlier work by Eisenmann (1933).
21 As an illustration of the importance of having different legislative chambers con-
trolled by different social groups, Montesquieu cites the example of the Venetian
Republic, which had constitutional checks and balances that meant little in practice,
because all veto points were controlled by the same social group. De L’Esprit des
Lois, book XI, chap. 6.
22 On this point, see the discussion in Raynaud (1993), and Manin’s considera-
tion of how modern forms of representative government have retained certain
“aristocratic” elements (1997).
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ensures that government creditors will control one of these veto points in
the future.23 In practical terms, if one assumes that control of one veto
point by government creditors is sufﬁcient to avoid a default, then those
deciding whether to invest in government debt will need to develop some
expectation about the likelihood that those who oppose default will have
veto power. If it is thought that there is a very high probability that own-
ers of public debt will control at least one veto point, then people will be
more willing to lend to the government. In other cases, however, outcomes
may be sufﬁciently uncertain that individuals would be dissuaded from
purchasing government debt. The legislative bargaining model developed
in Chapter 2 of this book considers the effect of multiple veto points
under two different scenarios: when the future identity of veto players
is known and when future control of veto points is random. In the case
where government creditors are certain to have control of a veto point, not
surprisingly, there is less risk of opportunistic actions such as default on
debt. When future control of veto points is random, however, the effect is
much less signiﬁcant. In other words, constitutional checks and balances
may have little effect on credibility unless there is some mechanism that
ensures that government creditors are the ones to enjoy veto power.
Beyond uncertainty about future control, a further problem with mul-
tiple veto points as a commitment device is that even if government cred-
itors have veto power over policy, this may be insufﬁcient to ensure that
public debt is repaid. The reason here is that default frequently occurs in
situations where there is no agreement on the alternative (raising taxes
and/or cutting spending). A government that aims to repay its debt needs
to maintain a tax rate that generates sufﬁcient revenue to meet its debt-
servicing obligations. In an economy with a constant rate of growth and
no shocks to economic activity, debt servicing could be assured with a
stable tax rate. Under these conditions, as long as government creditors
controlled one veto point, they could successfully oppose any attempts
to change this rate. In practice, governments may need periodically to
adjust tax rates and levels of spending to respond to revenue shortfalls.
23 Tsebelis (2002) fully acknowledges that policies may not be stable even when there
are multiple veto points, if veto points are controlled by players with similar prefer-
ences, but to my knowledge this implication has not been considered in discussions
of multiple veto points and credible commitment. McCarty (2000) has developed
general propositions about the effect of veto power on outcomes, but for a bargain-
ing context where preferences are homogeneous. Londregan (2001) has considered
the effect of veto points when the future bargaining context is uncertain, but not
when future control of veto points is subject to uncertainty.
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As a consequence, when revenues are unstable and unpredictable, holding
veto power may be insufﬁcient to guarantee full repayment of debt.
The above discussion leads to my ﬁrst principal argument. Constitu-
tional measures establishing multiple veto points may reduce default risk, but
they are neither a necessary nor a sufﬁcient condition for this outcome. They
are not always necessary, because in some representative assemblies cred-
itor interests may have an outright majority. At the same time checks and
balances may be insufﬁcient to ensure debt repayment if there is substan-
tial uncertainty whether government creditors will hold veto power in the
future, or if revenues are unstable and unpredictable.
Party Government in a Plural Society
Rather than establishing commitment through constitutional checks and
balances, an alternative possibility I consider is that credible commitment
in a democracy results from the compromises necessary to form a durable
majority in a legislature that represents a diverse society. Even if owners
of government debt are a small minority within the legislature, if they par-
ticipate in a broader majority coalition, bargaining within this coalition
may result in “moderate” policies with regard to debt and taxation. If
wealth holders anticipate this outcome, they will be more likely to invest
in government bonds.
In a frequently cited work, Schattschneider (1942) argued that in so-
cieties where there is conﬂict over multiple issues and where the divid-
ing lines in each conﬂict do not coincide, then any legislative majority
that votes cohesively on multiple issues will need to be held together
by compromises and concessions that lead to moderate policies. For
Schattschneider, political parties were the primary means in a represen-
tative democracy of cementing such compromises. He also suggests that
the moderating effect of creating a legislative majority is a clear impli-
cation of James Madison’s claim in Federalist No. 10 that the diversity
of interests in a large republic makes it less likely that any one individ-
ual interest will dominate. In Schattschneider’s opinion, Madison failed
to foresee that if bargaining to construct a legislative majority necessar-
ily leads to compromise, this might actually obviate the need for con-
stitutional checks and balances in order to guard against tyranny of the
majority.24 Schattschneider’s argument is also related to the well-known
24 (1942: 9). See also Hofstadter (1969) on this point. Kernell (2001) and McLean
(2001) provide recent discussions of the contradictions between Madison’s writings
in Federalist No. 10 and Federalist No. 51.
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comparative politics literature on “cross-cutting cleavages” that suggests
that when social divisions tend to cross-cut each other, policies are likely
to be more moderate. As an example, this would be the case in a society
divided between “rich” and “poor” as well as Catholic and Protestant,
but where not all “rich” are Protestant and not all “poor” are Catholic.25
It is also related to work in the ﬁeld of American politics and in the ﬁeld
of international relations.26
This vision of political party formation is strikingly close to that pre-
sented in a number of recent game-theoretic models of parties. Voting
in legislatures presents a collective dilemma in which there are strong
incentives for a majority party to form in order to improve on the ex-
pected outcome of voting in the absence of parties. One can illustrate this
possibility using the example of a three-member legislature facing three
proposed bills, each of which would provide a positive payoff to two
members while providing a negative payoff to a third member (with the
third member differing in each case). If a bill is not approved, players
receive zero utility. In this sort of a game, Aldrich (1995) and Schwartz
(1989) have emphasized that two players can improve their payoff if they
could commit to a party platform of only voting in favor of the one bill
that provides them both with a positive payoff. One can extend this model
of political party formation and legislative bargaining to a more general
setting, using a legislative bargaining model ﬁrst developed by Baron and
Ferejohn (1989).27 In Chapter 2, I present a game-theoretic model that
demonstrates how the politics of public debt can be affected by cross-
issue deals and by formation of political parties. In doing so I make sure
to take account of the critique made by Krehbiel (1993), who argued that
25 See Almond (1956), Lipset (1960), and Lipset and Rokkan (1967).
26 See Aldrich (1995), Key (1964), and Stokes (1999) for accounts from the ﬁeld of
American politics on parties as collections of heterogeneous groups. Work in the
ﬁeld of international relations has also emphasized the implications for credibility
of the multi-issue nature of political debate. See Frieden (1994), Martin (1994), and
Stasavage and Guillaume (2002).
27 In doing so I draw on work by Calvert and Fox (2000) and Jackson and Moselle
(2002). Alternative models of parties as solutions to collective dilemmas faced by
legislators have been developed by Cox and McCubbins (1993) and Snyder and
Ting (2000). Roemer (1998, 1999, 2001) constructs a model where the presence
of an ideological dimension inﬂuences choice of policies on a second, economic
dimension. His model differs from that developed here in that, rather than focusing
on a political party as a means for actors with different policy preferences in a
legislature to commit to a common platform, hemodels a gamewhere, in an electoral
context, party members differ over the extent to which they prefer to win an election
even if this implies a compromise on policy.
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observed party cohesion may reﬂect similarities in preferences rather than
an independent effect of parties on outcomes.
As with the argument about constitutional checks and balances, my
argument about party formation and credibility is based on a number of
assumptions that may not always hold. First, if government creditors are
in the minority, then party formation can improve credibility only if there
are multiple dimensions of social conﬂict. This is an observable implica-
tion of the argument that I consider at length in the following chapters.
In societies where all conﬂicts can be distilled into a single dimension
and where preferences across this dimension are highly polarized, a leg-
islative majority is unlikely to be moderate.28 A second requirement is
that there must be means to ensure party cohesion; individual legislators
must be able to commit to voting the party platform, even in cases where
their short-term interest would be better served by voting otherwise. So,
in the case relevant to this book, legislators whose constituents do not
own debt must be prepared to support debt repayment in order to gain
the support of creditors on other issues. Real-world political parties have
evolved a number of mechanisms to ensure cohesion, such as the possi-
bility of sanctioning members who deviate from the party line. I show
that party members can beneﬁt from the repeated character of legisla-
tive bargaining in order to enforce cooperation.29 The empirical chapters
of this book will investigate the actual mechanisms developed by politi-
cal parties in eighteenth-century England and France to enforce internal
cohesion.
The argument that party formation in a plural society can improve
credibility is further complicated by the possibility of electoral volatility.
Take the case where a legislature contains a majority party of which gov-
ernment creditors are a part. To the extent they think this party may not
retain its majority in future elections, wealth holders will invest in gov-
ernment debt only if they are paid a higher rate of return that includes a
default premium. As a result, we should expect trends in default premia on
debt to be correlated with anticipations about the partisan composition
28 This possibility was explicitly recognized by Schattschneider (1942). If there is only
one dimension of conﬂict, but preferences are not highly polarized, then this may
also clearly lead to a moderate outcome.
29 See Calvert and Fox (2000).More generally, my arguments here follow the approach
proposed byCalvert (1995a, b) tomodel a social institution (such as a political party)
as an equilibrium outcome of an underlying repeated game.Mymodel is also closely
related to Bawn (1999), where players subscribe to an ideology that is deﬁned as
the equilibrium strategy proﬁle of a repeated game.
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of future legislatures. This is a key observable implication of the theory
that I consider in subsequent chapters.
The above discussion leads to my second main argument: In societies
withmultiple dimensions of conﬂict, the process of party formationwill reduce
default risk provided that government creditors are members of the majority
coalition. Default premia will also be lower to the extent that this coali-
tion is expected to retain power. While this argument implies that party
government may lead to credible commitment even in the absence of con-
stitutional checks and balances, these two alternative arguments are not
necessarily exclusive. In some cases, credibility may depend on both the
process of party formation and the presence of multiple constitutional
veto points. This would be the case if government creditors were a small
faction of a larger party that controlled one veto point in a political system
with multiple veto points.
This argument about party formation may seem surprising, given the
implications from social choice theory that policy instability is likely to oc-
curwhen there aremultiple issue dimensions (in the absence of a structure-
induced equilibrium of the sort identiﬁed by Shepsle 1979). While social
choice theory in the context of legislative bargaining assumes that all
alternatives are considered simultaneously, in Chapter 2, I adopt the as-
sumption that legislative proposals are considered sequentially, and that
if a proposal receives a requisite majority it is implemented for some
amount of time. This plausible assumption yields equilibrium outcomes
even for cases of multidimensional bargaining where social choice theory
would predict that there would be no stable outcome.30 While sequential
choice theories of bargaining do not require institutions such as a com-
mittee structure to generate stability, when there are multiple dimensions
of policy, creating institutions such as a political party may nonetheless
allow legislators to realize signiﬁcant gains. It is also worth noting here
that even under social choice assumptions, it has been recognized that
there are strong incentives for individuals to form coalitions, and these
coalitions can imply trade-offs across issue dimensions, leading to mod-
erate policies.31
One ﬁnal implication of party governmentworth considering is that it is
a fundamentally democratic means of achieving credibility. Commitment
in this case is supported by amajority, rather than depending on according
30 For a thoughtful discussion of the reasons for preferring either the sequential choice
or the social choice assumptions, see Baron (1994).
31 See Laver and Schoﬁeld (1990) and Schoﬁeld (1993).
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some special status or privileges to owners of government bonds. To the
extent that party formation is accompanied by creation of an ideology,
then this ideology will also need to focus on ideas that resonate with a
majority of the population, and thus it will need to emphasize some project
that goes beyond the simple need to please government bond holders.32
Bureaucratic Delegation
A third feature of representative democracy that may inﬂuence commit-
ment involves granting authority to unelected ofﬁcials or intermediaries.
There are reasons to believe that delegation ofmanagement of government
debt to an independent agency, like a central bank, can increase credibil-
ity of debt repayment. This claim parallels more general arguments about
the potential for bureaucratic delegation to change economic policy out-
comes.33 The literature on public ﬁnance in eighteenth-century Britain
has suggested that the Bank of England (created in 1694) played a critical
role in the modernization of British state ﬁnance.34 While the Bank of
England did not yet set monetary policy as does a modern central bank,
it did arguably fulﬁll several functions that made it more costly for the
British government to default on its debts. For one, because government
revenues were increasingly channeled through the bank, some have ar-
gued that any decision to default would have quickly led to a halt in
payments from the bank to the government.35 In addition, as the largest
lender to government during this period, in the event of a suspension of
payments on debt, the bank might have organized a creditor cartel that
would refuse to make any future loans to government.36
In strong contrast with Great Britain, France during the eighteenth
century did not succeed in establishing a national bank. Some have ar-
gued that the French government’s difﬁculties in obtaining access to
cheap credit during this period were directly linked to this absence of
institutional reform. Others have argued that despite its failure to create
32 This argument would still be consistent with a rational choice approach if one
referred to ideology as a rule for sharing beneﬁts between different members of a
coalition, as modeled by Bawn (1999).
33 While bureaucratic delegation is relevant for a large number of areas of economic
policy, the best-known example involves delegating monetary policy to an indepen-
dent central bank. See Cukierman (1992) for an extensive survey.
34 See, e.g., Broz (1998), North and Weingast (1989), and Root (1994).
35 This is suggested by North and Weingast, following an earlier argument by
Macaulay (1861).
36 See Weingast (1997b).
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a national bank, the French monarchy before 1789 was able to make
at least a partial commitment to repaying its debts by borrowing indi-
rectly through corporate bodies and local assemblies.37 As discussed in
Chapters 4 and 6, this indirect borrowing can also be seen as a form of
bureaucratic delegation to the extent that it removed debt servicing from
day-to-day management by the Crown.
My third principal argument suggests that bureaucratic delegation will
improve credibility only if government creditors already have inﬂuence within
a representative assembly. Much theoretical work on delegation and com-
mitment makes the simplifying assumption that once a decision has been
made to delegate, it can be reversed only at great cost. More recent work
on the politics of delegation has demonstrated that this assumption is not
always tenable in practice and that nominally independent government
agencies often respond to pressures from partisan political principals.
In some political systems, politicians who delegate to nominally inde-
pendent bureaucrats actually retain substantial room to inﬂuence future
decisions. One way in which this can occur is through the implicit or
explicit threat of revising a bureaucratic agency’s statute. Such threats
will be more menacing in political systems where power is concentrated
in the hands of a single individual, such as a monarch or dictator. In
contrast, if government creditors have political inﬂuence within a repre-
sentative assembly, then they may be able to block any attempts to revise
an agency’s statute.38 Interestingly, this argument also corresponds closely
with eighteenth-century views about the feasibility of establishing a na-
tional bank in an authoritarian system. Kaiser (1991) was the ﬁrst to high-
light the fact that contemporary observers in eighteenth-century France
thought that a national bank could have little authority in an absolute
monarchy. As far as credibility is concerned, then, bureaucratic delega-
tion is at best a complement, but not a substitute, for having representative
political institutions.
When Are Representative Institutions Stable?
One possible objection to my arguments about representative institu-
tions and commitment is that they rest on the assumption that actors
37 Sargent and Velde (1995) have focused on the absence of a national bank in France.
Bien (1989), Potter (1997, 2000), Potter and Rosenthal (1997), and Root (1989,
1994) have considered the practice of borrowing through intermediaries.
38 A point made by several authors, including Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) and
McCubbins, Noll, andWeingast (1989); see also Keefer and Stasavage (2001, 2002).
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who feel disadvantaged by policy decisions have no option but to respect
them. This is not a plausible assumption for eighteenth-century France,
nor for Great Britain, nor would it be justiﬁed in many countries today.
Chapter 7 considers whether the theoretical propositions about represen-
tative government developed in Chapter 2 can hold even in a context
where parliamentary groups have an “outside option” of resorting to
political unrest.39 Chapter 7’s extension to the theoretical model devel-
oped in Chapter 2 relies on the basic idea that actors will be more likely
to resort to rebellion the more they dislike the policies adopted by ma-
jority vote in the legislature. As a result, “moderate” policies are less
likely to trigger extraconstitutional action by the minority. Some theorists
such as Kelsen (1932) have suggested that the threat that the minority
might exercise an outside option can be a force leading to more moderate
policies.
Two main conclusions appear from Chapter 7. First, the process of
party formation in a plural society can lead to credible commitment even
when there is a threat of unrest. Second, the mere threat of the minority
exercising an outside option will not necessarily be sufﬁcient to prompt
the majority to adopt a more moderate policy. I then argue that even if
members of the majority do not have an incentive to compromise in or-
der to reduce the risk of an outside option being used, when there are
multiple political cleavages in society, the process of forming a legislative
majority may nonetheless lead both to moderate policy choices and to
a reduced likelihood of extraconstitutional action. Chapter 7 then con-
siders this possibility using historical evidence from France and Great
Britain.
The discussion about the stability of representative institutions also
raises a further question: Would credible commitment through political
bargaining be possible even outside the framework of democratic institu-
tions? When there are multiple cleavages it might be possible for political
bargaining to result in moderate politics even in an autocracy. While this
is entirely plausible, it would need to be shown what institutional mecha-
nisms in autocracies allow heterogeneous interests to make commitments
over time in the same way that political parties allow diverse groups to
commit to a common policy platform in representative democracies.
39 In previous work, Ellman and Wantchekon (2000) have considered how the exis-
tence of this sort of outside optionmight inﬂuence electoral outcomes. Powell (1996,
1999) has considered the effect of outside options (the ability to resort to force) in
interstate bargaining.
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4. Alternative Routes to Credibility
While different features of representative government might reduce risk of
default, there are also alternative forces that could have this same effect.
These involve the risk of capital ﬂight, the possibility for government
creditors to serve as a lobby, and the effect of restrictions on political
participation.40 While each of these factors might allow commitment, the
latter solution achieves this outcome through means that observers today
would characterize as being fundamentally undemocratic.
Capital Mobility
When capital is mobile, governments may be more wary of taxing it heav-
ily, so as to avoid a massive ﬂight of funds from their countries. This
might be true both with regard to taxes on capital, as well as for default,
which can be seen as a one-off tax on holders of government bonds. Stud-
ies of globalization have made much of this idea recently, and it can be
seen as a more general manifestation of Lindblom’s (1982) conception of
“the market as prison” or other arguments about the “structural power
of capital.”41 The implication for public debt may be that rather than
studying commitment problems, one might better study the question of
how to reduce the preponderant inﬂuence of government creditors on
policy choices. In the extreme case, if it were possible for owners of cap-
ital to shift their assets costlessly and instantaneously in anticipation of
government actions, then credibility problems involving debt and capital
taxation would disappear altogether.42
There are a number of reasons to believe that in the case of govern-
ment borrowing, capital mobility is unlikely to serve as a full solution
to commitment problems.43 The most basic reason involves the fact that
by lending to a sovereign government, individuals actually cede control
over their capital. This means that in the case of default, in the absence
40 Chapter 2 also considers the issue of reputation as a source of commitment.
41 On this latter issue, see Przeworski andWallerstein (1988). Arguing that capital mo-
bility can actually help promote democracy, Bates and Lien (1985) have investigated
the implications of capital mobility in the historical context of eighteenth-century
France and Great Britain.
42 This possibility has been formally modeled by Kehoe (1989).
43 Arguments about the structural power of capital often also overlook the signiﬁcant
costs that capitalists face in reversing other types of investment decisions. In recent
years economists have recognized that many investment choices, such as the choice
to build a factory in a particular country, are essentially irreversible once made
(see Dixit and Pindyck 1993).
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of some third-party enforcement, the only way creditors can sanction a
government is by refusing to lend in the future and investing their funds
elsewhere. This is the key intuition behind a model developed by Bulow
and Rogoff (1989), who show that fear of high future borrowing costs
may be insufﬁcient to dissuade many governments from defaulting.44 It
is true that a government may suffer from an immediate increase in bor-
rowing costs if it is even feared that default is likely, but this does not alter
the basic argument that capital mobility may be insufﬁcient to guarantee
commitment to repay debt. Finally, this argument is also supported em-
pirically by the fact that today, in a context where capital is much more
mobile than in the eighteenth century, many emerging market countries
still pay very high risk premia on their debt issues. If capital mobility
could guarantee commitment, one would expect emerging market coun-
tries to be able to borrow at interest rates similar to those paid by OECD
governments.
Financial Sector Lobbying
Rather than trying to inﬂuence policy through representation in a legisla-
ture or participation in a political party, an alternative route for govern-
ment creditors to gain inﬂuence on economic policy is to act as a lobby.
The advantage of this strategy is that it may necessitate less compromise,
and it may allow government creditors to retain their inﬂuence regardless
of which political party has majority control. For lobbying to be success-
ful, representatives must not be fully accountable to their electors. Other-
wise, those who represent the non-debt-holding majority will be obliged
to follow the majority’s ex post facto preferences to default. Under these
circumstances, even if government creditors are in the minority within a
legislature, they may nonetheless be assured of repayment of government
debt if their lobbying inﬂuence is sufﬁciently strong. Lobbying can involve
campaign ﬁnance contributions (to legislators who value remaining in of-
ﬁce regardless of the policies they choose), patronage, or bribes. In cases
where ownership of ﬁnancial capital is concentrated in a narrow group
of wealthy individuals, while ownership of other factors of production
is spread more widely, then lobbying will lead to outcomes that are less
democratic to the extent that some individuals will have greater lobbying
resources than others. While evidence that ﬁnancial sector interests lobby
governments is plentiful, as with the argument about capital mobility,
44 I discuss this model in greater detail in Chapter 2.
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one should not immediately assume that this provides an irresistible force
in all countries obligating governments to repay their debt. Otherwise it
would be difﬁcult to explain why many governments continue to pay very
high risk premia on their debt issues.
Restrictions on Political Participation
Rather than rely on the ability of government creditors to buy inﬂuence, in
many countries historically, credibility of public debt has been reinforced
by fundamentally undemocratic means: restricting the access of certain
groups to the political system. This can involve formal restrictions on the
suffrage as well as requirements for serving as a representative.While laws
of this type controvert what most people today would see as a fundamen-
tal democratic principle, it is important to recognize that in the eighteenth
century it was commonly seen as being legitimate to restrict political par-
ticipation in this manner. There was broad support in eighteenth-century
Britain for the idea that only those who owned property should be eligible
to vote and to hold elected ofﬁce, and despite controversy, this principle
remained a feature of politics in both the early American republic and in
France in the years after its revolution (Manin 1997). Restrictions on po-
litical participation undoubtedly provided the principal explanation for
the weak representation of labor in the British Parliament after 1688 as
well as in the French National Assembly after 1789. As a result, this book
makes the simplifying assumption that labor was essentially absent from
politics.
5. Observable Implications of My Arguments
My goal for the empirical sections of this book is to adopt a method-
ological approach that is eclectic yet rigorous. The phenomenon I seek to
explain is government credibility, deﬁned as the perceived likelihood that
a government will honor debt contracts. Chapter 4 presents a number of
different measures of credibility for the French and British governments
over the course of the eighteenth century. I then examine relevant observ-
able implications formy three arguments concerning constitutional checks
and balances, party formation, and bureaucratic delegation. Some observ-
able implications can be tested quantitatively using time-series evidence.
More frequently, I rely on historical evidence.
My ﬁrst argument suggests that constitutional checks and balances
can improve credibility, but they are neither a necessary nor a sufﬁcient
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condition for doing so. This is obviously quite a general statement, and so,
based on available evidence from France and Great Britain, I restrict my-
self to one main implication of the theory: Credibility may not be assured
even when there are multiple veto points. For Great Britain I consider to
what extent there was substantial variation in the perceived likelihood of
a default after 1688. As argued above, the existence of signiﬁcant volatil-
ity in interest rates on government debt after the Glorious Revolution is a
potential indication that the constitutional changes of 1688were not sufﬁ-
cient to establish credibility for U.K. government borrowing. For France,
the evidence is necessarily more speculative for the period before 1789.
Existing work has assumed that the Estates General, if convened, would
have taken actions in order to repay debts. I consider whether there is
evidence to support an alternative interpretation; given the balance of
political forces in France at the time, a default would have occurred even
if the Estates had been called. I perform a similar exercise for the case
of the French Constituent Assembly in 1789.
My second argument suggests that in countries where there are mul-
tiple dimensions of political conﬂict, the process of forming a majority
will lead to commitment, provided that government creditors are mem-
bers of the coalition. One observable implication here is that trends in
partisan control should be correlated with trends in credibility, and this
can be tested with time-series evidence on partisan control of government,
interest rates on government debt, and prices for assets such as Bank of
England stock. One should expect to observe that government creditors
were members of the party that tended to be associated with low default
premia when it was in power. I also examine to what extent contemporary
observers saw changes in the partisan control of government as signiﬁcant
for ﬁnancial markets. There are further observable implications of this
second argument. If credibility was high we should expect to see that mul-
tiple dimensions of conﬂict existed, and that members of coalitions had
the necessary mechanisms to enforce agreements over time. Both of these
implications can be evaluated using historical evidence on the functioning
of political parties in the British Parliament after 1688. I do the same for
the French Constituent Assembly after 1789.
My third argument involves the claim that bureaucratic delegation will
only improve credibility in cases where government creditors already have
political veto power. This issue can be addressed by comparing British and
French experiences in this area. Both the British and French governments
made attempts during the course of the eighteenth century to improve
their access to credit by creating national banks or by borrowing through
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intermediaries, yet only in the British case did government creditors actu-
ally enjoy signiﬁcant power within a representative assembly. In Britain
the principal innovation in this area involved the creation of the Bank
of England in 1694 and subsequent decisions to increase the role that it
played in government ﬁnance. In France monarchs also attempted to use
bureaucratic institutions to improve their access to credit. These involved
the creation of John Law’s bank (1716–20) and a number of initiatives
to borrow through bureaucratic intermediaries. If the evidence here is
consistent with the argument, then one would expect to observe that the
failure of bureaucratic institutions to improve credibility in France was
directly attributable to the monarchy’s penchant for unilaterally revising
contracts with agents of the Crown. In Great Britain the argument would
imply that the performance of the Bank of England was closely linked to
the political fortunes of the Whig coalition in Parliament that continu-
ally supported the bank. In the absence of Whig support, my argument
would imply that the bank would have been subject to the same sort of
interference as occurred with bureaucratic arrangements in France.
6. Plan of the Book
Chapter 2 of this book presents the credibility problem in government
borrowing in greater detail, and it builds a game-theoretic model that I
use to support my three arguments about checks and balances, political
parties, and bureaucratic delegation. Chapter 3 then presents historical
background material by reviewing the development of public borrowing
in early modern Europe. This includes a discussion of the emergence of
modern institutions for public borrowing in the Netherlands during the
sixteenth century, followed by England after 1688. Chapter 4 reviews the
experience of public borrowing in Great Britain and in France between
1688 and 1789, relying on data covering rates of interest on government
loans and episodes of default in order to measure trends in credibility.
The goal here is to make comparisons both between the two countries
and over time within each country. Chapters 5 and 6 continue the investi-
gation by examining to what extent observed trends in credibility can be
accounted for by partisan politics and by the structure of political institu-
tions. Chapter 7 then considers the stability of representative institutions.
Chapter 8 presents a summary and conclusion.
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